The large inflow of investment capital to commodity futures markets in the last decade has generated a heated debate about whether financialization distorts commodity prices. Rather than focusing on the opposing views concerning whether investment flows either did or did not cause a price bubble, we critically review academic studies through the perspective of how financial investors affect risk sharing and information discovery in commodity markets. We argue that financialization has substantially changed commodity markets through these mechanisms.
1
Over the last decade, commodity futures have become a popular asset class for portfolio investors, just like stocks and bonds. This process is sometimes referred to as the financialization of commodity markets. According to an estimate provided by the CFTC in 2008, investment inflows to various commodity futures indices from early 2000 to June 30, 2008 totaled $200 billion (CFTC, 2008 . Concurrently, a large number of commodities across the energy, metal, and agricultural sectors experienced a synchronized boom and bust cycle in [2007] [2008] . During this period, the price volatility of many commodities spiked.
This high price volatility has led to growing concern of the public and in policy circles as to whether financialization has distorted commodity prices, and whether more government regulation in these markets is warranted. Michael Masters, in his 2008 testimony to the U.S. Senate, argued that futures market speculation had caused a bubble in oil prices in 2007 and 2008, leading to significantly higher energy costs for consumers (Masters, 2008) . This "bubble" view was later echoed by former Congressman Joseph Kennedy II (Kennedy, 2012) , extended to grain commodities in a U.S. Senate report (U.S. Senate, 2009), and also was advocated abroad by then-British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2009 (Brown and Sarkozy, 2009 ).
On the other hand, many economists, such as Krugman (2008) , Stoll and Whaley (2010) , Irwin and Sanders (2012a) , and Fattouh, Kilian and Mahadeva (2012) , argue that there is little systematic evidence to support the bubble view and that speculators in commodity markets are no cause for concern. The debate between this "business-as-usual" view and the aforementioned "bubble" view has garnered substantial attention from academics and policymakers alike.
The truth is likely in between these two extreme views. It is important to note that rejecting one does not necessarily justify the other. Rather than focusing on these two extreme views, we argue that researchers should test whether financialization has affected commodity markets through the mechanisms that underpin the functioning of these markets: storage, risk-sharing, and information discovery. Viewed through this lens, the evidence suggests that financialization may have transformed the latter two functions of commodity futures markets.
Commodity futures markets have had a long history of assisting commodity producers to hedge their commodity price risks. The longstanding hedging pressure theory of Keynes (1923) , Hicks (1939) , and Hirshleifer (1988) posits that hedgers are typically on the short side of futures markets and need to offer positive risk premia to attract speculators to take the long side. By bringing a large number of financial investors to the long side, financialization mitigates this hedging pressure and improves risk sharing, as suggested by Tang and Xiong (2012) . However, as pointed out by Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2013) , and Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2012) , financial investors also have time-varying risk appetites owing to risk constraints and financial distress. For example, financial investors may have to unwind their long commodity positions if sudden price drops in other markets lead them to reduce risk. As a result, they transmit outside shocks to commodity markets. Financialization thus affects risk sharing in commodity markets through the dual roles of financial investors: as providers of liquidity to hedgers when trading to accommodate hedging needs and as consumers of liquidity from hedgers when trading for their own needs.
Financialization may also affect information discovery in commodity markets. Due to informational frictions in the global supply, demand, and inventory of commodities, centralized futures markets supplement commonly decentralized spot markets in information discovery, a la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980) . For example, the futures prices of key commodities such as crude oil, copper, and soybeans have been widely used as barometers of the global economy in recent years. In the presence of informational frictions, Singleton (2012) emphasizes that heterogeneous expectations among financial investors can lead to drift in commodity futures prices. Sockin and Xiong (2012) show that noise brought by trading of financial investors in futures markets can feed back to the commodity demand of final-goods producers. The key friction is that goods producers cannot differentiate whether futures prices move due to financial investor trading or due to changes in global economic fundamentals.
We revisit several focal issues in the debate from the perspective of these two mechanisms.
First, informational frictions help explain the puzzling price increases of many commodities in early 2008. As pointed out by Hamilton (2009a) and Kilian (2009) , a key factor in explaining the commodity price boom in recent years is strong commodity demand from China and other emerging economies coupled with a stagnant commodity supply. However, this factor fails to explain the large price increases in the first half of 2008, a period when the price of crude oil increased by over 40% before hitting a peak of $147 per barrel in July 2008. It is difficult in hindsight to argue that emerging market growth, itself slowing after late 2007, could have more than offset the slowdown of developed economies to raise oil prices by 40% over six months. One possibility is that final-goods producers increased their oil demand after temporarily mistaking the price increase in oil futures as a signal of robust economic growth when it may have been induced by noise in futures market trading.
Second, one strand of the literature examines the effects of speculation based on the premise (which is motivated by the theory of storage), that inventory must have risen if speculation distorted futures prices upward (Kilian and Murphy, 2013; Juvenal and Petrella, 2012; Knittel and Pindyck, 2013) . These studies find that the price boom of crude oil in 2007-2008 was not accompanied by an inventory spike and are cited as evidence supporting the business-as-usual view. However, an inventory response to the rise in prices presumes that traders in equilibrium distinguish between a rise in prices induced by speculation and a rise in prices induced by changes in economic fundamentals. This presumption may be unrealistic in the face of informational frictions in spot markets. Instead, futures market speculation may distort price discovery and induce a temporary price boom accompanied by a demand response that mistakes the futures price increase as a signal of strong future fundamentals and unaccompanied by an inventory response.
Third, a significant number of empirical studies in the debate focus on directly linking futures price changes to the trading of financial investors based on the notion that their trading must be correlated with contemporaneous futures returns or be able to predict futures returns in the presence of any distortions. Standard correlation and Granger causality tests tend to be inconclusive. These unconditional tests assume that observed changes in positions are all due to shifts in the demand curve of financial traders. The market clearing condition implies that observed position movements of financial traders comprise both shifts in their demand curve as well as shifts in the demand curve of other traders in the market. In a classic version of the simultaneity bias in econometrics this leaves undetermined the sign of unconditional correlations or Granger causality tests of futures returns with the trading of financial investors, as the link is positive at times when financial investors consume liquidity but is negative when financial investors provide liquidity to commercial hedgers. Studies that employ clearer identification strategies have provided clearer evidence on the price impact of trades initiated by financial traders.
Despite the seemingly confusing evidence presented in the debate, we emphasize that organizing the evidence in terms of risk-sharing and information discovery provides a clearer picture of whether and how financial investors have affected commodity markets. Testing extreme yet elusive views that financial investors did or did not cause a commodity price bubble is unlikely to bear further fruit.
I. Basic Facts

A. Commodity Price Dynamics and Macro Fundamentals
Commodity futures prices have experienced a boom-bust cycle over the past ten years. Figure   1 plots commodity futures prices for the GSCI total returns index and three commodities from 2000-2011, normalized to their average 2000 level. At their peak in the summer of 2008, oil prices were nearly four times their average 2000 price, before collapsing suddenly later that year. The GSCI Total Returns index, which tracks futures prices in a basket of commodities across agriculture, energy, and metal sectors, peaked at over three times its average 2000 level.
In searching for explanations for this pronounced "super-cycle" in commodity prices, researchers have noted that commodity futures price dynamics have changed substantially since 2000 and in particular since the financial crisis. Of particular interest have been both crosscommodity correlations and correlations of commodity prices with prices in other asset classes. Figure 2 plots the cross-commodity correlation of the different sectors of the GSCI index with the GSCI Energy index and shows that correlations rose from a pre-2004 range of -0.2 to 0.2 to a peak of 0.7 in the middle of 2008. Even across sectors, commodity prices have tended to move together as a class since the 2000s. This is consistent with the notion that commodity prices have shared a common boom and bust cycle.
Correlations of commodity prices with prices in other asset classes have also changed. Figure   3 Many macroeconomic explanations have been put forth in explaining these patterns. A great deal of discussion has focused on oil prices, given their historically important role in the real economy (Blanchard and Gali, 2010; Hamilton, 2005) and subsequent attention from policymakers (Brown and Sarkozy, 2009) . Although supply shocks to oil have traditionally received significant attention, which is perhaps not surprising given the history of oil supply shocks such as those in the 1970s, recent research has attributed much of the post-2003 rise in oil prices to increases in global demand (Kilian, 2009 ). 2 The growth of demand from emerging markets such as China and its interaction with stagnant production in the 2005-2007 period have been of particular concern (Carney, 2008; Hamilton, 2009a Hamilton, , 2009b . The substantial increase in correlations of commodity prices with the emerging markets and Shanghai A indices plotted in Figure 3 , as well as the increasingly negative exchange rate correlation, are consistent with the view that these fundamental demand factors from outside the U.S. have shaped oil prices.
This growing resource demand from emerging markets, as well as the adoption of technologies such as ethanol that arguably turn agricultural commodities into substitutes for oil (Peñaranda, and Micola, 2011) , have been cited as fundamental reasons as to why commodity prices have increased not only in oil, but across the board. Data from China Customs indicates that imports of soybeans, cotton, sugar, copper, and aluminum have grown significantly over the preceding decade, and markets routinely follow these numbers as leading indicators of demand. The increase in crosscommodity correlations plotted in Figure 2 is also consistent with this conjecture that these fundamental demand factors are shaping not only oil prices, but many other commodity prices.
B. The Changing Nature of Futures Market Participation
The composition of participants in commodity futures markets has also dramatically changed over the past decade. Traditionally, researchers have viewed commercial hedgers and non-commercial traders (such as hedge funds) as the two major classes of market participants.
Commercial hedgers such as farmers, producers, and consumers regularly trade commodity futures to hedge spot-price risk inherent in their commercial activities. Non-commercial traders, such as hedge funds or other managed money vehicles, invest others' money on a discretionary basis in commodities, commodity futures, and options on futures, and make extensive use of leverage.
Over the past decade, there has been a large inflow of investment capital from a class of investors, so-called commodity index investors (CITs), also known as index speculators. CITs
seek exposure to commodity prices as part of a broader portfolio strategy. They treat commodity futures as an asset class just like stocks and bonds, and often invest in instruments linked to broad- to a concern that financialization in the form of index speculation contributed toward the dramatic run-up in commodity prices.
II. Economic Mechanisms
Before we dive into the intensive debate about the effects of financialization, we first review several economic mechanisms through which futures market trading can impact commodity prices.
We first describe the standard theory of storage, in which the spread between futures price and spot price serves as the incentive to store a commodity over time. We then describe two other mechanisms---risk sharing and information discovery. Although they have received much less attention in the ongoing debate about the financialization of commodity markets, these two mechanisms are widely regarded as the key ways that trading may impact many other financial markets.
A. Commodity Storage
The theory of storage of Kaldor (1939) , Working (1949) , Brennan (1958) , and Telser (1958) emphasizes a timing option embedded in holding a storable commodity. As the holder of such a commodity can choose to either consume the commodity or save it for future consumption, the price of the commodity is the maximum of its current consumption value and the expected value from consuming it at a future date when the commodity supply is scarce. The option of delaying consumption thus makes the commodity price higher than the value from consuming all currently available supply and gives rise to a convenience yield of holding the commodity. This notion of convenience yield has motivated a strand of the literature to model the term structure of commodity futures prices by parameterizing the dynamics of the convenience yield (Brennan, 1991; Gibson and Schwartz, 1990; Casassus and Collin-Dufresne, 2005) .
The convenience yield is ultimately driven by the non-negativity constraint of commodity inventory. When there is a shortage of a commodity, one cannot simply borrow from future supply to fulfill current consumption. Scheinkman and Schethtman (1983) first develop a dynamic rational expectations model with risk-neutral agents to analyze the impact of the non-negativity constraint on the dynamics of commodity prices. They characterize the agent's optimal consumption/storage decision in the presence of uncertainty about the balance between future supply and demand. Their analysis formalizes the intuition from the previous literature and generalizes numerical models of Wright and Williams (1982) . Building on this dynamic framework, Laroque (1992, 1996) highlight that commodity storage can smooth prices and induce serial dependence in prices even when commodity supply and demand follow independent and identically distributed processes. They also provide empirical evidence that this insight helps explain the serial correlation commonly observed in commodity prices.
In the theory of storage, the futures basis (the spread between the futures and spot prices) of a storable commodity is directly related to the cost of storing the commodity, which includes costs of warehousing and financing. If the spread is higher than the cost, a commodity carry trade of buying the commodity in the spot market, shorting a futures contract, and carrying the commodity to make the delivery leads to an arbitrage. Nominal interest rates are an important factor that drives the futures spread because they affect the financing cost of the carry trade, which Fama and French (1987) confirm empirically. Through this interest-rate channel, Frankel (2006) argues that monetary policy has an important effect on commodity prices. Gruber and Vigfusson (2012) provide both theoretical and empirical analyses to show that by reducing inventory cost, lower interest rates decrease commodity price volatility.
Routledge, Seppi, and Spatt (2001) (1965) . This prediction is consistent with the earlier finding of Fama and French (1988) that among industrial metals, futures prices are less variable than spot prices when inventory is low and that the variability is similar when inventory is high.
If agents are risk neutral, commodity futures prices should reflect agents' expectations regarding future spot prices, which in turn makes the futures spread a useful predictor for future spot prices. Fama and French (1987) find only mixed evidence that the futures spread is a useful predictor of future spot prices. Instead, their analysis indicates the importance of a time-varying risk premium component in the futures spread. In subsequent studies, Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2013) further relate this risk premium to commodity inventory, while Hong and Yogo (2012) relate it to growth of open interest. Alquist and Kilian (2010) also confirm that the futures spread of crude oil does not provide more predictive power than the current spot price, and instead argue that uncertainty about future oil supply drives the futures spread through precautionary demand.
B. Risk Sharing
One of the original reasons for developing commodity futures markets was to facilitate more efficient sharing of commodity price risk. Farmers are heavily exposed to price risk in crops that are yet to be harvested; producers of oil, copper, and gold are exposed to their respective price risk, and airlines face the risk of higher fuel costs induced by rising oil prices. Centralized commodity futures markets provide convenient platforms for producers and consumers of different commodities to hedge commodity price risk in their commercial businesses and thus to facilitate more efficient risk sharing among a broad set of agents.
B.1 Hedging Pressure
The long-standing hedging pressure theory of Keynes (1923) and Hicks (1939) emphasizes that commercial hedgers, who are typically net short in the commodity futures market, face insufficient interest from other participants on the long side and need to offer premia for unloading their risks. Such risk premia, all else being equal, cause commodity futures curves to tilt towards backwardation. For this reason, this theory is also called the theory of normal backwardation. The key friction in this theory is the (partial) segmentation of commodity futures markets from the broad financial markets, which leads to inefficient risk sharing.
In the modern literature, Hirshleifer (1988 Hirshleifer ( , 1990 provides formal models to lay out specific assumptions that underlie inefficient risk sharing in commodity futures markets. Hirshleifer (1988) adopts a static CAPM setting with commodity producers initially endowed with both aggregate market risk and idiosyncratic commodity risk. Producers can sell a commodity futures contract to speculators to diversify the commodity risk. However, a fixed participation cost limits the riskbearing capacity of speculators on the long side of the futures market, and thus endogenously determines the equilibrium premium for the idiosyncratic commodity risk. Hirshleifer (1990) further clarifies several other necessary conditions. In particular, he addresses why consumers who face the opposite commodity price risk from producers do not hedge, which would otherwise eliminate the producers' hedging pressure. As consumers face price risk across multiple commodities they consume, and producers face concentrated price risk in the specific commodity they produce, the fixed cost of participating in each futures market deters consumers more than producers.
On the empirical front, Carter, Rausser, and Schmitz (1983) and Bessembinder (1992) provide evidence that average returns from holding commodity futures positions tend to be significantly positive conditional on hedgers taking net short positions, while significantly negative conditional on hedgers taking net long positions. They also document a significant premium for idiosyncratic risk in a set of agricultural commodity futures returns. De Roon, Nijman, and Veld (2000) provide evidence that hedging pressure on a commodity futures market stems from not only its own-market but also hedgers' short positions in other closely related commodities, or so-called cross-market hedging. On the other hand, Rouwenhorst and Tang (2012) review the literature and conclude that the empirical support linking excess returns to hedging positions is more mixed.
B.2 Returns to Passive Investment
Several recent studies find that in the historical data, rolling over commodity futures contracts provides attractive investment returns. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) The high return from investing in passive commodity futures indices is consistent with the hedging pressure theory. In particular, several features indicate that commodity futures markets were partially segmented from each other and from outside markets during the period analyzed by these studies. First, the high average roll return gives a direct measure of the premium hedgers offer to unload their commodity price risk, which ultimately reflects the insufficient risk-bearing capacity on the long side. Second, the lack of correlation between the futures returns of individual commodities is in sharp contrast to the well-known large positive correlations between unrelated stocks in the same stock market and reflects the partial segmentation of individual commodity futures markets from each other. Third, the negative return correlation between commodities and stocks also suggests that systematic risk, which the asset-pricing literature identifies as a key factor in explaining returns of many asset classes such as stocks, bonds and currencies, was not an important factor in the positive returns to commodity futures.
C. Information Discovery
In the presence of informational frictions about global supply and demand of commodities, centralized futures market trading serves to aggregate dispersed information by market participants across the world. This makes commodity futures prices important price signals to guide commodity demand and thus an important feedback channel for futures market trading to affect both commodity demand and spot prices.
C.1. Informational frictions
Participants of commodity markets face severe informational frictions. The globalization of many industrial and agricultural commodities has exposed market participants to informational frictions regarding the supply, demand, and inventory of these commodities around the world.
Aggregating such information from different countries or regions is challenging. The statistics from emerging economies are often scarce and unreliable. The statistics from OECD countries, while more reliable, are often delayed and also subject to subsequent revisions. Information regarding the supply and inventory of oil is difficult to capture completely, as it incorporates both above-ground, below-ground, and ship-board supplies. The process of quoting spot prices has also arguably been subject to manipulation due to these informational frictions (Scheck and Gross, 2013) .
Motivated by the pervasive informational frictions in commodity markets, Singleton (2012) argues that heterogeneous beliefs can lead market participants to engage in speculative trading against each other, which, in turn, may induce commodity prices to drift away from fundamental values, and result in price booms and busts. Furthermore, he documents economically and statistically significant effects of investor flows on oil futures prices and attributes these effects to risk or informational channels distinct from changes in convenience yield.
C.2. Informational role of commodity futures prices
Trading in spot markets is subject to several practical complications. First, there is substantial heterogeneity in quality and grades of any given commodity, say crude oil. This heterogeneity can lead to a significant variation in the traded prices. Second, the cost of transporting the commodity to different locations around the world allows the commodity of the same quality to be traded at different prices at different locations.
Trading in futures markets serves as an important platform for aggregating dispersed information and mitigates informational frictions in spot markets. Futures contracts are usually standardized and precisely specify the quality and grades of the commodity to be delivered at a specific location and time. The standardized contracts make their prices easier to evaluate.
Furthermore, the convenience of trading futures contracts without necessarily taking or making physical delivery allows people from all over the world to trade in a few centralized futures exchanges, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and the London Metals Exchange (LME).
Roll (1984) Broadly speaking, economic policymakers across the world also pay close attention to commodity prices for information regarding inflation. In March 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) raised its key interest rate, citing high commodity prices at the time as a key reason for it to be concerned by potential inflation risk. The awkward timing of this interest rate increase on the eve of the worst global recession in several decades highlights the strong influence that commodity prices exert on economic policymakers.
C.3. Information aggregation and feedback effects
The economics literature has long acknowledged that centralized trading in asset markets serves an important role in aggregating dispersed information possessed by market participants. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Hellwig (1980) developed the canonical workhorse models for analyzing information revelation in asset prices. Due to the presence of noise traders, who trade for reasons unrelated to asset fundamentals, equilibrium asset prices only partially reveal informed traders' private signals in the first model and the asset fundamental in the latter. Recently, Smith, Thompson, and Lee (2013) adopt this framework to characterize the determinants of informational efficiency in commodity spot prices. Sockin and Xiong (2012) develop a theoretical framework to analyze informational feedback effects of commodity spot and futures prices on commodity demand. Their framework integrates centralized commodity market trading under asymmetric information with an international macro setting, as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) and Angeletos and La'O (2013) . In this setting, a continuum of specialized goods producers whose production has complementarity ---which emerges from their need to trade produced goods with each other ---demand a key commodity, such as copper, as a common production input. Through trading the commodity, the goods producers aggregate dispersed information regarding unobservable global economic strength, which ultimately determines the demand for their produced goods and thus the goods producers'
demand for the commodity. The model features a unique log-linear equilibrium in which the commodity price is a function of global economic strength and informational noise originating from either supply-side uncertainty or non-fundamental futures market trading.
In the absence of any informational frictions, standard economic intuition suggests that: 1) a higher commodity price leads to a lower quantity demanded by commodity consumers; 2) a positive supply shock reduces price and boosts quantity demanded; and 3) futures prices are a shadow of spot prices through the standard no-arbitrage relation.
When goods producers face unobservable shocks to demand and supply and noise in futures market trading, these standard intuitions may not hold. Due to the informational role of commodity prices, demand may increase with price. This is because a higher commodity price signals a stronger global economy and motivates each goods producer to demand more of the commodity for producing more goods. This informational effect offsets the cost effect. The complementarity in production among goods producers magnifies the informational effect through their incentives to coordinate production decisions and can lead to a positive price elasticity of their commodity demand. Due to the same mechanism, noise from futures market trading can affect goods producers' expectations of global economic strength and thus feed back to their commodity demand and the spot price of the commodity, causing futures prices more than just a shadow of spot prices.
A supply shock also has an amplified price effect. As goods producers cannot differentiate a price decrease caused by a positive supply shock from a price decrease caused by a negative demand shock, they partially attribute the supply shock to the demand shock. This reduces the incentive of goods producers to demand a greater quantity of the commodity at the lowered price.
III. Focal Issues in the Debate
We now discuss several focal issues in the debate through the lens of these economic mechanisms.
A. What Is Speculation?
The debate has largely focused on whether excessive speculation has distorted prices.
Conceptually, hedging is usually defined as trading in futures markets to mitigate cash flow risk in one's endowed business, while speculation is defined as trading in futures markets to profit from price movements. Excessive speculation in futures markets has been defined traditionally as speculation in excess of what would be required to satisfy hedging demand, for example, as in Working (1960) .
Many academic and policy studies of futures markets tend to operationalize this definition through two long-standing practices. One practice is to classify all market participants into hedgers and speculators based on certain identification schemes and then to treat all trading by hedgers as hedging and all trading by speculators as speculation. The other practice is to treat hedgers' hedging demand as exogenous and fixed.
These practices are intuitively appealing and convenient to implement, and thus have had a long-standing influence on the measurement and study of speculative activity in futures markets.
In measuring positions in futures markets, the COT report itself, with a history dating back to 1924, classifies trader positions into two categories: those of Commercial and Non-Commercial traders.
Studies analyzing the role of speculation, dating from Working (1960) , have analyzed the role of Working's T, also known as Working's speculative index, a ratio of position held by speculators to that of hedgers. It is common to interpret a high index or high volatility of the index as indicative of excessive speculation. This interpretation of Working's T assumes that the total measured level of hedgers' positions is the exogenous hedging demand and that the variation in Working's T is being driven by trading by speculators.
However, these practices face serious limitations. The first practice ignores the different motives for commercial hedgers to trade in futures markets. As suggested by Figure 5 , the volatility of commercial hedger positions is quite high. show that although commercial hedgers in wheat, corn, soybeans, and cotton do take short positions to hedge crop exposure, the volatility in their positions is many times the volatility of output and revisions to output forecasts. Price changes prove to be a far better explanatory variable for short-term changes in hedgers' positions than changes in output forecasts. Using weekly COT data from 1994 onward in 26 commodities, Kang, Rouwenhorst, and Tang (2013) and Rouwenhorst and Tang (2012) show that hedgers trade weekly in a contrarian manner by selling when prices are high and buying back when prices are low. Hartzmark (1987) shows that the daily trades of hedgers earn significant profits. Taken together, hedgers trade more than just to hedge risk in their commercial businesses.
In contrast to the second practice, speculators do not just trade amongst themselves-they trade with commercial hedgers. For example, the position changes of commercials and non-commercials in Figure 5 are largely mirror images; Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2013) provide evidence for trader groups defined in finer categories. This implies that any "excessive trading" by speculators is associated with "excessive trading" by commercial hedgers. In the absence of further evidence, it is difficult to distinguish those who are consuming from those who are providing liquidity in these markets.
One possibility is that commercial hedgers may attempt to exploit informational advantages by trading against speculators. For example, commercial firms may exploit informational frictions in spot markets, as they may have better knowledge of local physical market conditions. This "selective hedging" has been observed in practice by Stulz (1996) and Knill, Minnick, and Nejadmalayeri (2006) . A second possibility is that participants in futures markets are not producers themselves, but are market-makers between the cash and futures markets who trade futures to hedge forward contracts written with the ultimate commodity producers such as farmers.
While risk-sharing is a central function of futures markets, the line between hedging and speculating is blurred in practice. If one takes the notion of speculation as trading for profit from price movements, all trader groups, including commercial hedgers, appear to be engaged in speculation on the margin. An analysis of who provides and consumes liquidity, and who performs what role in different periods, may be a more economically relevant analysis of trading activity rather than classifications based on trader status.
In analyzing the role of speculation by different trader groups in futures markets, the problem of treating one particular trader group as exogenous is pervasive. The market-clearing condition will imply that position changes of any trader group can be alternately providing liquidity during some periods or consuming liquidity in others, so that no trader group can be treated as plausibly exogenous. This problem has manifested itself most recently in the debate about the role of CITs in futures markets, to which we now turn.
B. Price Pressure from Index Speculation
The concern about index investment affecting commodity prices became particularly prominent after Michael Masters' testimony before the U.S. Senate (Masters, 2008) . By imputing CIT positions for oil using index weights and reported positions in the SCOT for Kansas City Wheat, Feeder Cattle, and Soybean Oil, he posited the so-called "Masters hypothesis," which, on its face, is a simple assertionthat the large boom and bust in oil prices was caused by index investment flows.
An early wave of studies examine this by testing whether CIT position changes are either contemporaneously correlated with futures price changes or Granger-cause changes in futures prices (Brunetti and Büyükşahin, 2009; Brunetti, Büyükşahin and Harris, 2011; Büyükşahin and Harris, 2011; Irwin and Sanders, 2012; Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin 2009; Irwin, 2011a, 2011b; Stoll and Whaley, 2010) , and find little relationship in a wide basket of commodities.
However, the 13-week change in CIT futures positions for oil predicts changes in futures prices in 2006 (Singleton, 2012 Hamilton and Wu, 2013a) . Gilbert (2010) argues that index investment does Granger-cause rises in food prices. Others also examine Working's T, and find few increases (Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin, 2010 , in addition to many of the above papers). Cross-sectional tests do not find higher monthly or quarterly returns in commodities in which CITs dominate the market .
While a useful first step in describing the data, the conflicting results from these tests highlight the limitation of their empirical design. Tests of whether CIT position changes are correlated with price changes treat CIT position changes as exogenous, which lead to downward-biased estimates of price impacts in a classic version of the simultaneity bias in econometrics (Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong, 2013 Direct tests of price impacts and impacts on correlations should incorporate clear identification strategies in the spirit of Angrist and Pischke (2010) . Recent papers which exploit variation in motives for trading have found effects of CIT trading in certain contexts. Henderson, Pearson, and Wang (2012) find that trading of new commodity linked notes (CLNs), a form of index investment, leads to positive price pressure in futures markets around a two-day window of the pricing date, and that this price impact increases with the size of the trade. Mou (2011) examines the interaction of hedge fund trading in response to the so-called roll of CITs and finds that these pre-specified rolls allow hedge funds to profit at the expense of index investors. Further work along this line is needed.
C. Effects on Risk Sharing
C.1. Index speculation and risk-sharing
In asserting that the primary cause of the oil boom and bust was index investment, the Masters hypothesis oversimplifies its potential effect on commodity prices by ignoring the underlying 4 These issues are compounded given the issues with data from the COT reports, particularly given the simultaneous interest in oil but lack of well-measured data for CIT positions in non-agricultural commodities. Instead, much of the above literature often uses data on swap-dealer positions, either from the public Disaggregated COT (DCOT), or from the proprietary CFTC Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) data underlying the COT reports, to proxy for CIT positions. However, swap dealer positions are a very noisy proxy for CIT positions, as it co-mingles positions of both commodity index traders, who trade in financial swaps, and physical commodity swap dealers who are not CITs (intuitively, there were swap dealers in commodity futures markets well before the advent of CITs). On the other hand, the original methodology proposed by Masters (2008) appears at odds with the low-frequency "special call" data about CIT positions in all commodities (including non-agriculturals) the CFTC has gathered via survey (Irwin and Sanders, 2012) . Overall, there is no consensus on how to measure CIT positions outside of agricultural markets.
mechanisms. The large inflow of financial capital to the long side of commodity futures markets is likely to affect risk sharing by integrating the previously segmented commodity futures markets with outside financial markets. Several findings from recent studies are consistent with such a possible integration. First, by analyzing the daily futures returns of individual commodities, Tang and Xiong (2012) find that the correlations between different commodities have increased after 2004 to significantly positive levels from levels close to zero. In particular, they find that the correlation increases are particularly pronounced for commodities inside popular commodity futures indices. 5
Second, several studies, such as Robe (2011, 2013) and Silvennoinen and Thorp (2011) , show that the return correlation between commodities and stocks has turned significantly positive after 2008, in sharp contrast to the negative correlation between them in the previous years. Robe (2011, 2013) provide further evidence linking the positive correlation between commodities and stocks to the trading of hedge funds, although this may not hold generally (Büyükşahin, Haigh, and Robe, 2010) . They find little effect of CIT trading on commodity-equity correlations. However, it does appear that correlations across contracts within commodities have increased significantly since 2004, consistent with the rise of CIT trading (Büyükşahin et al., 2008) . Recent theoretical studies help explain risk sharing in commodity markets with heterogeneous agents. Basak and Pavlova (2012) analyze an endowment economy in a continuous-time setting with multiple commodity goods and two types of agents. One type of agent has standard power utility preferences, while the other type ---index investors ---has preferences benchmarked to the level of a commodity-investment index. The presence of index investors causes the futures returns of those commodities in the index to have higher correlations with each other and with the stock return than those outside the index. Baker and Routledge (2012) develop a dynamic endowmenteconomy model with two goods, one of which is oil, and two types of agents with different risk preferences within the Epstein-Zin recursive preference structure. Their calibration analysis shows that dynamic risk sharing between the two types of agents can generate wide variations in prices, risk premia, and open interest over time. Baker (2012) develops a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous risk-averse participants and storage to evaluate the effects of financialization. In his model, financialization reduces the cost to household consumers of trading in a futures market, which is initially dominated by commercial producers and dealers. His calibration shows that financialization accounts for a significant reduction in the commodity futures excess return and the frequency of futures curve backwardation.
C.2. Time-varying risk appetite
Several recent studies, such as Etula (2010), Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2012) , and Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2013) , emphasize that financial investors' risk-bearing capacity, and thus the risk premium and degree of risk sharing, vary over time. They emphasize that the group of traders driving prices at any given moment is given by the group with the strongest incentive to trade. While the hedging pressure theory posits that commercial hedgers compose this group, these studies emphasize that this group can at times change to financial traders, consistent with the growing strand of intermediary pricing theory. This theory emphasizes that at times, especially during crises, reduced risk appetite may cause financial traders to unwind positions (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Kyle and Xiong 2001; Gromb and Vayanos 2002; Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009; He and Krishnamurthy 2009; and Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand 2010) . Etula (2010) shows that the relative leverage of the broker-dealer sector (a measure of financial traders' risk-bearing capacity) has significant predictive power for futures returns of a set of commodities, especially for energy commodities. Acharya, Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2012) use the default risk of a set of energy producers to measure their hedging demand. They provide evidence that futures risk premia of the related energy commodities increase with the producers' hedging demand and, furthermore, the fraction of the futures risk premia attributable to producers' default risk is higher when broker-dealer balance sheets are shrinking.
Motivated by the financial distress experienced by many financial institutions during the recent financial crisis, Cheng, Kirilenko, and Xiong (2013) analyze the reallocation of commodity risk between financial traders and hedgers during the crisis. By using changes in the VIX to proxy for shocks to financial traders' risk-bearing capacity, they find that during the crisis, albeit not before the crisis, increases in the VIX led financial traders such as commodity index investors and hedge funds to reduce their net long positions in 12 agricultural commodities. The market-clearing condition implies that this was coupled with reductions in futures prices and hedgers' short positions, leading to a reallocation of commodity price risk from financial traders to hedgers during the crisis. This result highlights financial traders' dual roles as both liquidity providers and liquidity consumers to hedgers.
D. Did Speculation Distort Spot Prices?
A central question in the debate is whether speculation in futures markets, either by CITs or other speculators, distorted spot prices. After the price boom in 2008, several economists, such as
Krugman (2008), Hamilton (2009a) , and Smith (2009), pointed toward the lack of inventory response to futures prices as reason to doubt speculative effects on spot prices. The logic follows the theory of storage. If speculation drives up the futures price of a commodity, the increased futures spread to the spot price would induce more commodity storage, which in turn would drive up the spot price as less of the commodity is made available for current consumption. Knittel and Pindyck (2013) examine the U.S. data on crude oil production, consumption, inventory, and the futures spread, and find little evidence for this storage effect in the data for the 1998-2012 period.
Kilian and Murphy (2013) use a structural vector autoregressive approach to analyze speculative effects on oil spot prices through this storage mechanism. Using data on crude oil production, global real activity, the real price of oil, and above-ground oil inventories, along with sign restrictions on the impact of innovations of these four variables on other variables and bounds on demand and supply elasticities, they argue that "speculative demand" shocksshocks to above- With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to argue that the growth of the emerging economies, themselves slowing, was strong enough to more than offset the weakness in the developed economies to push up oil prices by over 40% in half a year.
The puzzle is then how perceptions of demand could have strengthened in early 2008.
Explicitly accounting for the informational role of commodity prices helps solve this puzzle. In early 2008, agents in the economy could have reasonably interpreted the large increases in futures prices of oil and other commodities as positive signals of robust commodity demand from China and other emerging economies. In fact, the large commodity price increases even motivated the European Central Bank to increase its key interest rate in March 2008. The large increases of commodity prices in early 2008, a portion of which may be attributable to investment inflows into commodity markets coming from the declining real estate market (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas, 2008) , may have temporarily distorted people's expectations of global economic strength and thus commodity demand by distorting price signals. 8
Overall, in the presence of realistic informational frictions faced by market participants, using observed commodity demand to justify high commodity prices and rule out speculative effects is insufficient. Although challenging, structural models should explicitly account for the informational role of commodity prices.
IV. Conclusion
The bubble view and the business-as-usual view are both too simplistic to capture the impact of the financialization on commodity markets. Instead, understanding the impact of financialization on commodity prices requires a focus on how it affects the economic mechanisms of commodity markets. We highlight risk sharing and information discovery as two important channels.
The following directions will likely be particularly fruitful for future research. First, future research must update its practice of categorizing trading by hedgers as hedging and trading by speculators as speculation. A systematic modeling of the different trading motives of hedgers and speculators at different times is necessary to uncover dynamics of risk-sharing in commodity futures markets. Second, incorporating informational frictions and the informational role of commodity prices into existing theoretical and empirical frameworks is likely to significantly improve our understanding of the boom and bust cycles of commodity prices. Furthermore, to the extent that commodity markets are an indispensable part of the global economy, it is important to understand how risk reallocation and information transmission from commodity markets affect the real economy and the global financial markets.
Figure 1: Commodity Prices
This figure plots the level of the GSCI Total Return Index as well as commodity prices for corn, crude oil, and copper, normalized to the average price in 2000. Data source: Bloomberg.
Figure 2: GSCI Sector Correlations with GSCI Energy
This figure plots the 252-day rolling correlation of percentage changes in the GSCI Energy Total Return Index with percentage changes in the GSCI Excluding Energy, GSCI Grains, and GSCI Industrial Metals Total Return Indices. Data source: Bloomberg.
Figure 3: GSCI Correlation with Asset Classes
This figure plots the 252-day rolling correlation of the percentage change in the GSCI Total Return Index with the percentage change in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, DXY Dollar Index (multiplied by -1), and return to the Shanghai A index in the left-hand panel, and the change in 10-year Treasury yield and return to the CRSP Value-Weighted Index in the right-hand panel. Data source: Bloomberg.
Figure 4: Open Interest
The 
